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The Other Side of the Hill
Co~nbat

Intelligence in the
Canadian Corps, 1914-1918
Dan Jenkins
l:j"'\or some, a discussion on military intelligence
and the First World War is the ultimate
oxymoron. They might ask: when and where did
generals display any use of intelligence? That
the Battle of the Somme continued beyond the
first clay, they might argue, demonstrates a
complete lack of military intelligence, or any
other type of intelligence for that matter. If there
ever was a war, they might add, where donkeylike officers led lion-like soldiers to slaughter
against barbed wire, machine guns, and
trenches, then the Great War was it. 1 The oft told
story of how Sir Launcelot Kiggell, Sir Douglas
Haig's chief of staff, upon seeing the
Passchenclaele battlefield and its sea of mud and
carnage, reportedly wept, "My God! Did we send
men to fight in that?" only to be answered by an
aid: "It's worse further up," has lent credence to
the position that the British high command was,
indeed, incompetent. The myth that British
generals were donkeys is an old one, and not
likely to disappear completely anytime soon at least in popular imagination. However, a study
of combat intelligence should help to dispel this
myth, for when intelligence was used wisely- as
it usually was in the Canadian Corps - it
increased the likelihood of success in the field.
It did this by dispersing some of the fog of war
and the resulting battlefield confusion. Good
intelligence gave planners the details necessary
for preparing the incredibly complex set-piece
battles that were the hallmark of First World War
combat. Such meticulous care and precision
preparation ensured that there were fewer
surprises on Zero Day, the day of attack, then
otherwise would have been the case. By cutting
through the fog of war, intelligence reduced the
assaulting troops' dependence on circumstance
and luck, while restoring to commanders some

l. ~

degree of control over events in what was an
otherwise highly chaotic environment. This was
no small matter, especially on battlefields where
communications were painfully slow, erratic and
unreliable. Officers and men of the Great War
faced conditions and technological advances that
had completely altered warfare from what they
had expected and trained for. To compensate,
the Canadians, and others, used combat
intelligence to help overcome such obstacles as
poor communications, heavy machine-gun and
artillery fire, entrenchments and barberecl wire,
and came to see it as a crucial element in waging
successful trench warfare.
Of course, there was more to winning trench
warfare than good intelligence, and this should
be made clear from the beginning. Intelligence
was only one of many factors leading to
successful operations. The importance of
terrain, weather, personality, tactics, bravery, and
other local and strategic considerations all
played their part, and their importance cannot
be dismissed or diminished. Nevertheless,
intelligence work was vital for planning purposes
and should be recognised, for intelligence was
everywhere and permeated all aspects of First
World War combat.
Despite its obvious importance to battlefield
success, combat intelligence remains a relatively
unexplored topic in Great War historiography.
J.E. Hahn's 1930 publication The Intelligence
Service Within the Canadian Corps, 1914-18,
is the principal exception. It deals directly with

the nuts and bolts of tactical intelligence
gathering, and reflects Hahn's experience as an
intelligence officer in the 4th Canadian Division.
The Intelligence Service is an excellent place to
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A Canadian Artillery observation post in the reserve line,
January 1918.

information. The Germans, after all. were not
stupid, nor did they volunteer information on
their strengths and weaknesses. In the face of a
hostile enemy, the Canadians had to gather,
interpret, sort, and incorporate such information
into their plans for themselves. The fog of war
was real, and the Canadian Corps had to find
ways to navigate through it- for failing to do so
meant almost certain death for countless young
men.

start research on combat intelligence, as Hahn
explains in an uncritical manner some of the
Corps' routine intelligence functions,
organisation and equipment requirements.
Unfortunately, he does not analyse intelligence
work in conjunction with other operational
arms. He omits for the most part any discussion
of artillery intelligence even though from late
1916, combat intelligence focused largely on the
needs of the gunners. Moreover, he sticks mainly
to the intelligence requirements of divisional and
lower commands. 2 On the other hand, neither
the British nor Canadian official histories
develop intelligence as a theme. 3 This is true for
other works as well, and largely because most
authors are simply not concerned with the
details of intelligence gathering in the field.
Consequently, we are often left guessing as to its
hidden importance to operations. It is not
uncommon to read, for example, that the
Canadian Corps was facing certain German
regiments, that these regiments were at half
strength, tired, suffering from low morale, or
awaiting reinforcement. What we are not always
told, though, is if these details were known at
the time, or if this is historical hindsight at work.
If they were known at the time, we are usually
not told how the Canadians came to know such

Men who fought in the Great War knew the
importance of intelligence for wining trench
warfare, and several of them wrote of their
experiences. Works by Andrew McNaughton,
Canada's premier artillery officer during the war,
and British veterans like John Innes, who wrote
about flash spotting and sound ranging, H.
Hesketh-Prichard and his account on sniping,
and articles by A.F. Brooks and H.
Winterbotham, who wrote on artillery
intelligence and survey work respectively,
provide important insight into the workings of
intelligence in the field. 4 Unfortunately, their
efforts to show the difficulties confronting
officers and men fighting a modern industrial
war, and the role intelligence played in such a
war, fell on the public's deaf ears, and were no
match for publications perpetuating the
generals-as-donkeys myth. Eventually those who
knew firsthand the importance of intelligence
stopped writing about it, and took their
experiences to their graves. The study of
intelligence petered out- that is until recently. 5
Today's scholarship surrounding tactics,
doctrine, unit organisation, firepower, military
professionalism, generalship, and logistics have
successfully challenged the Generals-as-donkeys
myth. 6 Thanks to these kinds of studies we can
more clearly see the difficulties faced by officers
and men of the Great War, and the enormity of
their challenge in the new combat environment.
Without our old blinders on it is easier to
acknowledge the talent and proficiency with
which British and Canadian officers performed
their duties. There is no better proof of this than
the final100 Days campaign that ended the war
with Germany's defeat. Donkeys could not have
led such a successful crusade.
Since the topic of intelligence is so vast, and
since intelligence permeated every decision made

8

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss2/2

2

Jenkins: The Other Side of the Hill: Combat Intelligence in the Canadian C

and every action taken in the Great War, it can
only be touched upon briefly in this article. This
overview of intelligence in the Canadian Corps
will, however, show just how important combat
intelligence was to the Canadian Corps'
battlefield success. By war's end the Canadian
intelligence organisation had evolved from an
understaffed, under-trained, and under-utilised
force into a highly competent and professional
body capable of gathering intricate and divergent
material on the enemy's positions and
capabilities. Any review of Corps operational
orders bears witness to the importance of the
intelligence service. The intelligence organisation
attempted to track down every possible German
machine gun location, strong point, observation
post, and gun emplacement amongst a variety
of other targets. It monitored both wire
destruction and construction, followed enemy
troop movements, identified the locations of
German reserve units and calculated how long
it would take these units to reach given sectors
of the front, and by what likely routes. It was
not uncommon for contemporary commanders
to praise the intelligence they received in their
after-action reports, while pointing out how the
information helped them win battles. The detail
contained in operational orders, the desire and
need to know everything about the German
position and the intervening terrain, the
increased complexity and specialisation of the
intelligence organisation, and the search for new
and improved techniques for collecting that
detail, all attest to the value Canadian planners
placed on the Corps' intelligence organisation.
The unbroken trench system on the Western
Front defined the war and determined the role
intelligence played. The close proximity of the
opposing lines offered a unique opportunity for
a tactical intelligence service. Since the enemy
lived within rifle shot, commanders had to be
vigilant and prepared to meet enemy forays at
any time. The closeness of the enemy also
diminished reaction time, which meant that
commanders had to discover every indication
of a forthcoming attack, however slight, to avoid
surprise and possible catastrophe. There was
no respite from active campaigning as in past
wars, when fighting was limited to fair weather
months. The enemy was always present, and he
had to be studied to understand his habits; it
was vital for survival to recognise when he was
in an aggressive or defensive mode. To this end,

it came to pass that every headquarters, from
battalion upwards, compiled detailed reports on
observations made of German activity seen and
sounds heard. Such a close analysis of the enemy
produced a mountain of information for
headquarters personnel to digest. Most of this
material may at first appear inconsequential, as
Intelligence Summaries and patrol and
observation reports are replete with references
to seemingly meaningless detail: German
parapet altered; Germans talking in a particular
trench or shell hole; a green flare over a certain
sector; one enemy aircraft flying east to west at
10:30 am over such-and-such a position.
However, to trained and experienced intelligence
personnel, this data helped build a repository
of facts on various sectors and the German
activity therein. From such profiles, intelligence
officers and staff planners pieced together
possible scenarios outlining German intentions,
resilience and resolve. The altered parapet might
mean that the Germans had readied gas
cylinders for use, or that the Germans were
constructing dugouts or machine gun posts. The
men talking might mean relaxed security on this
part of the German line, and therefore an ideal
spot for a Canadian raid. Intelligence officers
would link the green flare to the activity that
preceded or followed its firing to determine the
meaning of some of the German signals. They
would also track the aircraft's flight path to
determine what the observer was witnessing, and
to check how far behind friendly lines the plane
travelled. Knowing what the observer may have
seen could alter friendly planning. Flight path
patterns might point to a possible German raid
or attack on the sector in question. Determining
how far behind friendly lines the plane travelled
might show headquarters the depth of
penetration the Germans expected to obtain, and
the ultimate objective of the assault. Of course
one aircraft, or one pile of lumber, or one flare
was not conclusive evidence for formulating
opinions of German intentions, but when
amalgamated with the mass of other evidence
collected, certain conclusions regarding enemy
activity, habits and possible intentions, became
clearer.
The closeness of the opposing lines did not
mean thatintelligence gathering was easy. It was
not simply a matter of looking over a trench wall
and writing down all that was seen. Time and
again soldiers' diaries refer to the emptiness of
9
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An aerial photograph of a Canadian attack in progress on
the east end of the Hessian Trench, near Courcellette, on
26 September 1916. Explosions are clearly visible in the
top left corner (white puffs with dark shadows underneath).

Histories ofthe war regularly point out that
the trench lines barely altered over the four years
of slaughter. In a strategic sense this may be true.
At the tactical, trench level, stagnation did not
occur. Constant shelling and digging, for
example, continuously transformed the
landscape. Canadian soldiers who fought in the
Ypres Sector during the Second Battle ofYpres
in April1915, hardly recognised the place when
they returned to it a year later. By November
1917, during the Third Battle of Ypres, the
terrain had become wholly unrecognisable.
Where woods and farms once stood there
remained but a few burnt stumps and the
occasional brick or stone. Physical features were
&i obliterated under the weight of millions of
~ artillery rounds, and their locations were known
7
u only because they were once marked on maps.
~ Terrain features changed from one day to the
z next, and soldiers, even with maps in hand, often
had no idea where they were. Sergeant
McClintock remembered the devastation along
the battlefield. Rarely did one see a live German.
the Somme front in 1916 where he "went
For one thing, anyone popping their head up over
through the town of Pozieres twice and didn't
the parapet for more than a couple of seconds,
know it. It had a population of 12,000 before
and in the same spot more than once, was liable
the war. On the spot where it had stood not even
to lose it to an enemy sniper. One of the first
a whole brick was left, it seemed. Its demolition
warnings every man received when entering the
was complete." e
trenches for the first time was "Fear God and
keep your head down." Snipers made death
Defensive works, too, continually changed.
come quickly. Alexander McClinton, a sergeant
Every day the Germans added new wire
with the 87th Battalion, recalled one instance
entanglements, strengthened and thickened
where one of his mates stood "on the firing step,
those already in place, built dugouts, and shifted
pushed back his trench helmet and remarked
and camouflaged artillery emplacements,
that he thought it was about time for coffee. He
observation posts and unit headquarters.
didn't get any. A German sharpshooter, firing for
Trenches were always under construction, saps
the first time that day, got him under the rim of
dug, assault preparations made, reliefs in the
his helmet, and his career with the Canadian
line carried out, and new tactics experimented
forces was over right there." 7 If snipers were not
with. The British Army's General Headquarters'
active at the time it was still unlikely that peeking
(GHQ) call to identify the constantly shuffled
over a trench wall would gain much advantage.
German units was itself a tremendous task that
One could not see everything that needed to be
devoured enormous time and effort. To keep
seen from friendly lines at ground level, even
abreast of the incessant and rapid alterations to
with the aid of a telescope or field glasses. An
the ground and the enemy's position,
enormous effort was involved in gathering
commanders and men required a well organised
intelligence, and it became more complex as the
and efficient intelligence service.
war progressed. Techniques for unmasking
enemy positions increased in complexity handSince the tactical arena changed so quickly,
in-hand with the enemy's efforts to conceal them.
and so often, the need for planning information
10
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continued up to the last possible moment prior
to Zero Hour. Prior to raids and major offensives,
the collected intelligence meant that maps,
photographs, and training grounds could be
constantly up-dated to reflect the latest news.
One man remembered that when training for one
particular raid "Our practice section [of trench]
was changed a little several times, because aerial
photographs showed that the Germans had been
renovating and making some additions to the
trenches in which we were to have our frolic with
them. "9 After the Battle of Passchendaele,
Brigadier General W.A. Griesbach, commanding
the 1st Brigade, noted how small details affected
planing right up to the moment of attack. In his
after-action report he recorded that when the
brigade "learned that the enemy brought his
barrage down either on or immediately in rear
of our line, it was agreed that our forming up
for the attack should be as close to the enemy
as possible." Further,
When it was learned that whole companies had
been shot down and lay dead practically in the
line on which they stood while advancing under
the barrage. it was agreed that this Brigade would
advance to the attack in section columns behind
the barrage dashing from cover to cover, which
was done and was successful. When it was
learned that the enemy took cover in his pill
boxes but fought from trenches in the
neighbourhood of the pill box. it was agreed that
the attack must be made at high speed and with
great determination to catch the enemy before
he emerged from his pill box or as soon
thereafter as possible and this was carried out
and it was successful. 10

With proper intelligence, the
"poor bloody infantry" had a
better chance at surviving the
crossing of no-man's-land.
Battlefield intelligence did not
guarantee success, but without
it there was almost a certainty
of failure.

for example, occasionally placed dummy
soldiers in the trenches and manipulated them
by ropes. It also used imitation sandbags,
periscopes and sniper posts, and even built
entire sections of simulated trench. The
artillery used camouflaged netting and hid their
guns under trees and in towns. Artificial gun
flashes helped deceive enemy flash-spotters.
Fake gun emplacements, craters and tracks
also helped trick aerial observers and deceive
photographic clerks examining the black and
white images of the trenches. Dummy tanks
were used at Lens, in August 1917; and prior
to the Battle of Amiens in August 1918, the
Canadians used bogus wireless traffic in an
effort to deceive the Germans about their
location. To aid in the art of deception the
British created a camouflage organisation in
March 1916, and even concealed its intent by
giving it the innocuous sounding name "Special
Works Park R.E." It was a GHQ unit under the
direct control of the Engineer-in-Chief, and by
August 1918 employed nearly 300 men. In
1918, the Canadian Corps added its own
camouflage officer to its organisation to aid the
Corps' deception efforts. The Germans, likewise,
increased their concealment practices.
Intelligence personnel were kept busy sifting
through the false information to discover the
truth about the opposing lines.
The strength of the German defences
themselves called for intimate and ongoing study.
If assaults against a German position were to
have any chance of success, the strengths and
weaknesses of those defences had to be

~
~

~
~

The advent of aerial
observation and the closeness of
the opposing lines increased the
demand for camouflage and
deception during the war, which
required further adaptation in
the trenches. The British Army,
A team of horses pulls a dummy tank
into position, December 1917.
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discovered beforehand. The Canadians soon
realised that intelligence officers, by steadfastly
monitoring the German position, could create
profiles of given sectors outlining their suspected
weak spots. They could also note patterns in
German defensive methods. Knowing, among
other things, where unit and formation
boundaries ended, the usual time and frequency
of troop relief, and the typical layout of a machine
gun defence, aided Canadian planning, helped
win objectives, and reduced casualties in those
commands that took the time to learn such
details. Understanding friendly and enemy tactics
was, therefore, another facet of successful
intelligence work. Intelligence officers had to work
hand-in-hand with the operations branch, and
be current with improvements in the tactical
deployment of both friendly and enemy troops.
Knowledge of the overall plan was obligatory if
the required information was to be gathered as
part of an ongoing process. Intelligence personnel
had to understand enemy tactics in order to know
what to look for, when to look for it, and where to
concentrate their efforts.
Meanwhile, the Canadian Corps' position in
the larger British Army sometimes affected the
utility of combat intelligence gathered by the front
line troops and intelligence units. With the
Canadian command subordinate to British
authority, it was the British who made strategic
and most operational planning decisions. The
Canadians, regardless of what their intelligence
organisation told them, did not always have the
freedom of action to alter British-made plans.
This was particularly the case early in the war,
and before the Canadians earned their elite
status. If the British ordered the Canadians to
prepare an assault, that is what they did, even if
intelligence reports suggested that such an
assault was tantamount to suicide. The
Canadians might object, and often did, but if a
reprieve was not granted, they prepared their
assault. 11 This is not meant as a criticism of army
command structures, but it is important to
remember that lower level formations were not
always given much room to exercise
independence of thought, be they Canadian or
any other British formation.
On the other hand, being a subordinate
formation within the larger British Expeditionary
Force meant the Canadians were privy to a wealth
of British battlefield experience and

organisational expertise. General Headquarters
had numerous sources of intelligence available
to it: armies in the field, allies, the army's secret
service, and the foreign office's own secret service.
Armies had their own organisations and
intelligence, too, which they cheerfully shared
with their Imperial brethren. Each level of
command sought and generated different kinds
of intelligence. GHQ was largely concerned with
strategic and operational level intelligence, with
its greatest interest being the German order of
battle. That is to say, GHQ wanted to know the
composition of the German Army, how the
constituent parts were grouped to fight under
the various commands, and the combat
reputations of those parts. 12 It wanted to know
which divisions made up what German corps,
along with the fighting reputations of the various
commanders and formations. Knowing the
composition of the German Army, (i.e. the
number of corps, divisions, brigades and
regiments) let GHQ track individual German
formations and units across the front. By plotting
troop movements and positions GHQ estimated
probable locations for German offensive and
defensive operations. The German order of battle,
in other words, gave planners insight into the
mind of the enemy high command. Identifying
enemy units and formations was thus a major
concern of GHQ, and this concern filtered down
to battalions at the front whose role it was to
collect the information necessary (from prisoners,
documents, and other identifying material) for
higher command to confirm the actual
identifications.
GHQ had an interest in tactical intelligence
as well. It regularly issued translations of
captured German documents outlining enemy
tactical doctrine, and published its own tactical
pamphlets for BEF consumption. These were
invaluable tools for lower level commands when
planning offensive and defensive operations.
GHQ intelligence also prepared evaluations on
German attack methods, defensive techniques
and signals. In a 23 February 1915
memorandum, for instance, GHQ discussed the
German propensity for swift counter attacks on
any Allied gains, and counselled taking this fact
into consideration when planning offensives. J:J
Captured German documents describing lessons
learned from recent fighting were also invaluable
as guides for what to expect in the future.
Again, friendly troops could prepare accordingly.

12
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss2/2

6

Jenkins: The Other Side of the Hill: Combat Intelligence in the Canadian C

This Allied trench map shows a sector of the Vimy front around the town of Thelus in 1917. The map shows the trench
systems, both Allied and German, in considerable detail (based on aerial photographs) and includes the German
names for the trenches (gained from captured enemy documents and prisoners of war).

Helpful, too, were captured German
appreciations of Allied battle techniques. After
all, it was always good to know what the enemy
expected in order to do the opposite.
At army and corps headquarters the
intelligence requirements shifted. By war's end,
the British fielded five armies, all with
intelligence interests similar to those of GHQ,
but on a narrower scale. At the same time,
armies needed to learn more about the tactical
situation along their fronts than was of interest
to GHQ. Corps, on the other hand, were
principally concerned with tactical intelligence,
but had some interest in the larger strategic and
operational interpretations made by army
command and GHQ. To help co-ordinate and
control intelligence, the Canadian and other
corps prepared and printed for distribution a
daily Intelligence Summary of the previous day's
more salient discoveries and activities. These
provided a standardised, detailed recounting of
all new information on the enemy's defensive
position, including the location of gun
emplacements, the depth of wire entanglements,
and the location of dugouts, billeting areas and
lines of approach. As well, corps and army
commands were keenly interested in knowing
the location of ammunition dumps, rail lines and
so on, so that in the event of a breakthrough,
they would better understand what lay in the
green fields beyond. Corps also wanted to know

the number of German divisions in a given
sector. This was a good indicator of the number
of German batteries located there, as each
German division held a specific number of guns.
In turn, the disposition of the artillery was
usually a clear measure of the enemy's
aggressiveness. The number, calibre and range
of German guns, along with knowledge of the
exact direction they faced, told commanders a
great deal about possible German actions and
responses.
Enemy tactical dispositions were the main
concern of divisions, brigades and battalions.
Where exactly are the German machine guns
placed? Where exactly are their listening
stations, observation posts and command
centres? Where exactly are their communication
centres? Planners wanted answers to these and
a host of similar questions before assault plans
were finalised, for it was only in answering these
questions that headquarters could successfully
calculate and implement its plans. Moreover,
unit and formation commands made every effort
to learn for themselves the identity of the
German units opposite, as front line
commanders, like their GHQ counterparts,
wanted to know the reputations of those they
faced. To varying degrees, divisions, brigades
and battalions were also interested in what lay
behind the enemy's front line trenches. The
battalions' main concern, however, was in
13
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Figure One- Intelligence Sources in the Canadian Corps, August 1916
learning about no-man's-land and the German
front line trench system. To do this all battalions,
by May 1916, had formed specialist scouting
units, under a scout officer, that were responsible
for battalion-level intelligence gathering. By 1918
the scout section, also known as the battalion
scouts, proved so valuable that the Canadians
added a second officer to its strength. This meant
the typical scout section employed about 28 men:
eight snipers, eight observers, eight scouts, one
scout corporal, one photographic clerk and
draughtsman, and two officers. Brigades had
interests similar to battalions, but were also
interested in areas further to the rear. Like
battalions, brigades formed their own intelligence
sections to gather this information. Divisions, too,
were interested in the front lines, but were even
more concerned with the German rear areas.
Divisional intelligence teams were led by one of
the two General Staff Officers, second grade,
(GS02s), serving in Canadian divisions. In effect,
the closer a given command was to the front lines,
the more detail that command sought on the
German lines immediately across from them. The
further back a command lay, the more interest
it had in areas further behind the German front.
Figure One, "Intelligence Sources in the
Canadian Corps, August 1916" shows some of
the organisational complexity of the intelligence
system as practised by Canadians midway

through 1916. 14 As intricate as it was, this
organisation got even more complicated with
each passing year. In 1917, for example, a
Counter Battery Office (CBO) was formed to
control artillery intelligence. Eventually this
office became the hub around which all Corps
intelligence swirled. By 1917, the artillery was
clearly the dominant weapon system on the
Western Front, and its intelligence needs were
pervasive and paramount. As such, the CBO
eventually reached the point where it received
and interpreted most tactical intelligence
generated in the Corps, especially if it affected
gunner efficiency and action. With its being
linked to every source of intelligence in and
supporting the corps, the CBO was always upto-the-minute on the latest German
movements. In addition, the CBO, through a
quirk in the Corps' command structure, was
also the Heavy Artillery's tactical headquarters,
and by being well connected to these and every
other battery within and along the Corps' front,
the CBO could quickly return a devastating
barrage on targets wherever one was needed
most. Through its control and use of tactical
intelligence the CBO became one of the most
powerful tools in the British and Canadian war
effort. 1 "
In 1918, the Canadian Corps added the
Canadian Corps Survey Section (CCSS) to its

14
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structure. The CCSS was a mobile, tactical
intelligence gathering body formed in
anticipation of the more open fighting expected
that year, and in response to lessons learned
in 1917 and during the Germans' March 1918
Spring Offensive. It employed 177 all ranks,
was commanded by Captain W.R. Flewin, and
was under the CBO's tactical control. Part of
the cess team consisted of ground observers
who followed front line action closely, and
reported the latest friendly and enemy positions
to its headquarters, which, as it so happened,
was usually situated alongside the CBO. At the
same time, the cess flash spotters maintained
a constant vigilance for enemy artillery action
and movement. 16 Combined with other sources
of information, such as the Royal Air Force,
the cess helped maintain a flow of reliable
information during the more fluid battles of the
100 Days Campaign. 17

occupied the forward-most positions. These
parties patrolled no-man's-land each evening on
fact-finding missions, and acted as security
screens for friendly trench garrisons and work
parties. Operating just behind the patrols, but
usually outside friendly wire, were the listening
posts (represented as A1-A4). Like patrols,
listening-post work was normally conducted at
night. Further to the rear were trench observers,
snipers and sentries who kept watch during the
day and night. Ideally, patrols, observers, sniper
teams, listening post men, trench sentries, and
others worked together, confirming and verifying
reports, and guarding against surprise. Knowing
that a watch was kept, no doubt, also gave the
men in the trenches some degree of comfort, and
let them catch up on some much needed rest.
Compared to 1918, the battles of 1915-17
were highly rigid in their planning and execution.
In the summer of 1915, for example, the British
IV Corps advised the Canadians preparing to
assault at Givenchy that "The air photographs
and large scale maps now available admit of the
plan of operation being worked out in very great
detail previous to the attack, and under present
conditions in which communication is so

Figure Two, "Battalion-level Intelligence
Gathering, March 1916," illustrates something
of the interconnectedness of front line
intelligence gathering, and its importance in
offering protection against surprise. 18 As shown
in Figure Two, patrols (marked as D 1 and D2)

Figure Two- Battalion-level Intelligence Gathering, March 1916
enemy
trench
line

wire

Legend
A1-4: Listening Post (LP) Line.
Nine men per post on three man
shifts, and placed in or behind
obstacles (shell holes, ditches,
walls). Distance out: 75-125 yards.
81-4: Trench sentries, each with a
relief that sleeps by him, connected
to LP by cord or telephone wire.
Wire connected to alarm to attract
sentry's attention.
C1-4: Trenches or ditches used in
extreme light or in local conditions
where posts further forward are
inadvisable. Also used by support
groups or on nights that extra
observers are required.
W1-3: Lateral tug wires.
01-2: Patrols. Only one goes out
at a time. All posts informed. All
advanced patrolling performed by
regular scouts.
B1-A1; B2-A2; B3-A3; B4-A4: Tug
lines from LPs to sentries.
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difficult, it is essential that this should be done
by the Commanders concerned who must
satisfy themselves that every detail has been
considered." 19 The British document "Principle
Points to be Attended to in Making Preliminary
Arrangements," first issued after the Battle of
Laos in September 1915, declared that "Each
attack must be thought out in every detail, and
all arrangements worked out beforehand as
completely as possible." Everything, from
artillery plans, to signal arrangements, to the
timing that troops captured their objectives, was
determined in advance. 20
These years saw the perfecting of the setpiece assault. By their very nature these attacks
left little room for junior officer and other rank
initiative, as they were elaborately planned affairs
in which commanding officers and their staffs
made all major tactical decisions in advance.
They also planned each phase of the assault to
the minute. In these years communications,
counter battery fire and tactical training were
simply too brittle and under-developed to leave
the fate of an advance to junior officers and other
ranks- and so the need for elaborate pre-battle
planning. The fact that battalion and higher
commanders could not control the action once
it began reinforced the need for minute planning
prior to assaults. 21 Stated another way,
commanders, unable to control the action while
it raged, sought to control the fighting in advance
by planning operations to their fullest in the
relative calm of normal trench warfare. In such
a world, pre-battle intelligence, and the intensive
planning it permitted. restored to commanders
some degree of control over chaotic battlefields.
For the Canadians the zenith of such topdown control occurred at Vimy Ridge in April
1917. As is well known, that assault was
meticulously planned to the finest detail. Men
learned by rote when and where to go on a
minute by minute basis. The 76th Battalion's
orders offer a case in point. The movements of
its companies were precisely timed. According
to orders, at sixty minutes before Zero Hour the
troops were to begin arriving at the jump-off
trenches. At thirty minutes before Zero all ranks
were to be in position. At Zero the advance was
to begin, and seventeen minutes later "C" and
"D" Companies were "to take up sheltered
positions behind [specified] craters." Twelve
minutes after that "A" and "B" Companies were

to "take objectives and commence
consolidation." Sixteen minutes later, or fortyfive minutes past Zero, "C" and "D" Companies
were to move forward, followed at Zero plus
seventy-nine minutes by taking and
consolidating their assigned objectives. 22 There
was no margin for error or delay in these
instructions, nor was time allowed for
overcoming any unforeseen difficulties; it was
all matter-of-fact, and precisely pre-calculated.
Obstacles were removed during the pre-battle
planning stage. Timetable tactics, in effect,
greatly reduced command confusion, because
all foreseen contingencies and difficulties were
accounted for in advance of the attack - an
accounting based on a massive quantity of prebattle intelligence.
Pre-planning and intensive rehearsals over
replicas of enemy terrain in the weeks before
Zero burned into the minds of attacking troops
their role in up-coming fights. In this way, should
communications fail, as they likely would, or
some other difficulty arise to the point where
rear area officers lost touch with the progress of
their units, the attack would not necessarily
falter and die. Each day. as new intelligence came
in, the models were up-dated to reflect the latest
changes in the German defences and the
intervening terrain. At Vimy Ridge, as we have
seen, plans for the assault- one that would see
all four Canadian divisions attacking at the same
time for the first time- were extremely thorough.
Intelligence gathering took weeks and months
to complete. The 7th Brigade's report titled
"Information regarding German Signal Service,"
of 2 April 1917, for example, outlines the
German communications system. Its simple
description belies the enormity of the task.
"Thus, summarizing the information, it has been
possible to work out the German system of
telephonic communication right from the front
line to Regimental and Divisional Headquarters,
and this is one of the most valuable items of
information required for our operations. Their
destruction will seriously inconvenience the
enemy. "2 :1 A measure of the intelligence effort
involved in planning can also be seen in the 1st
Division's preparation of a 1 I 2,500 scale map of
its sector that it up-dated each day. This map
was in addition to all the army issued maps also
available to the Canadians. The 1/2,500 scale
map, however, was far more detailed, showing
all the German trenches along with their German
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names (obtained from a captured map), all
known trench mortar and machine gun
emplacements, dugouts, observation posts, and
so on. Airplane photographs and ground
observation also proved valuable for
accumulating this detail. According to a
divisional report "This Map was subsequently
proved to be very accurate and was of immense
value to all Units." It was also used to prepare a
full-scale practice course taped out over ground
similar to that which the Canadians would soon
be assaulting. On this practice ground
Every trench was shown by tape and flag,
numerous "Name Boards" being put up showing
the German name: trench mortar emplacements
and machine gun emplacements, Battalion,
Company, and Signalling Headquarters were all
marked on the ground. All Units, Infantry,
Engineers. and F.O.Os. [Forward Observation
Officers] that were to go over in the attack were
practiced in turn. and in conjunction with each
other over this Course ...
In addition ... a Plasticine Model on a Scale of 1 I
5.000 was prepared for the Division by an
Intelligence Officer at the First Army
Headquarters, assisted by a Draughtsman of the
Division. This Model was set up in a Hall at
Divisional Headquarters and studied by all
ranks, Artillery, Machine Gunners and Infantry. 24

Captain James Belton and Lieutenant E.G
Odell, in their book Hunting the Hun, recalled:
"When we reached our training areas, we saw
hundreds of yards of white tapes two inches
wide, stretched out before us. These tapes
represented to us the outline of the German
trenches which we were to attack and capture
on Vimy Ridge. They lay on the ground in exactly
the same position that we would later find the
German trenches. "2 .s Each division made similar
preparations, and the value of these training
courses to the final victory cannot be overstated.
The 3rd Division, in its after-action report, said
that with only one exception
all the objectives were gained and consolidated,
with comparatively slight loss, in practically the
identical manner and time thai had been
repeatedly practiced over a facsimile of the
trenches. Every man and Machine Gun arrived
in the appointed place, there was no loss of
direction. and the consolidation of the advanced
posts and defensive line was carried out precisely
as practiced. 26

Vimy Ridge was not the only operation where
models and replicas were used. The Canadians
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also used them prior to their assaults at Mount
Sorrel in June 1916, along the Somme in the
autumn, at Hill 70 in August 1917, and at
Passchendaele in the following October and
November. At Hill 70, as at Vimy Ridge the
previous April, the Canadians taped out
practice courses on ground similar to that they
would cross on Z-Day. The 1st Division's course
was made on a four-fifths scale. Some of the
information for building it came from local
inhabitants, but most came from airplane
photographs, ground surveillance and patrols.
The course depicted every German trench by
tape and flag. Again, "Name Boards" were put
up showing the German identified trenches and
positions, while "trench mortar and machine gun
emplacements, Battalion, Company, and
Signalling Headquarters were all marked on the
ground." Miniature models of the area were
constructed as well. The 2nd Brigade built one
such model on a scale of 1:40 at its training
school. In addition, an intelligence officer with
the 1st Army prepared a plasticine model of the
area on a l: 5,000 scale, and invited the
Canadians to study it. From these courses and
models the Canadians, with British assistance,
worked out solutions to specific tactical
problems they would face during the advance. 27
Such detailed planning was not just for the
benefit of commanders and their staffs, though,
as it also helped the lower ranks reach their
objectives. Sergeant McClintock recalled: "It is
interesting to note how every attack nowadays,
is worked out in advance in the smallest detail,
and how everything is done on a time schedule.
Aerial photographs of the position they are
expected to capture are furnished to each
battalion, and the men are given the fullest
opportunity to study them." Everybody had
"certain work to do and is instructed and reinstructed until there can be no doubt that he
has clear knowledge of his orders." In addition,
rehearsals and study, all based on the latest
intelligence, helped each man "understand the
scope and purpose and plan of the whole
operation, so that he will know what to do if he
finds himself with no officer to command." All
ranks had to "know what to do and how to do
it," and to think for themselves and "'carry on'
with the general plan," even if all the officers
and NCOs became casualties. McClintock
remembered his first experience raiding the
enemy lines and how "Once we started, we were
neither fearful, nor rattled. We had drilled so
17
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long and so carefully that each man knew just
what he was to do and he kept right on doing it
unless he got hit," and this despite the noise,
the stench, the shelling and the dead bodies the
assaulting troops stumbled over. Indeed, he
recalled that the German trenches he entered
during one raid "were practically just as we had
expected to find them ... They were so nearly
similar to the duplicate section in which we had
practiced that we had no trouble finding our way
in them." McClintock credits two acts that made
it possible to carry out orders.
One was the momentary quickening of the blood
which follows a big and unaccustomed dose of
rum and the other was a sort of subconscious,
mechanical confidence in our undertaking which
was the result of the scores of times we had gone
through every prearranged movement in the
duplicate German trenches behind our lines.
Without either of those int1uences, we simply
could not have left shelter and faced what was
before us.

There was still tremendous chaos at the front
end, to be sure, but careful planning helped the
troops keep their heads in environments where
they should have gone mad. This is not to say
that soldiers were not frightened - that would
be absurd, "Thinking men could not help but
be afraid." There was comfort, however, in
knowing that plans were well worked out in
advance, and based on the most complete and
thorough intelligence possible. 28
While it seems obvious that intelligence
played an important role in Canadian Corps setpiece attacks, the lack of intelligence also had
repercussions. At the Battle of Second Ypres in
April1915, the Canadians and their allies were
caught completely off guard by the German
assault and their use of poison gas, even though
there was ample evidence to show that such an
attack was imminent. On 14 April, eight days
prior to the German offensive, the Canadians
learned from the British V Corps of the
possibility of a German gas attack. The next day
the corps informed the 1st Canadian Division
that it was "not possible to test its [the report of
a possible poison gas attack] credibility but
certain facts tend to corroborate it. The Corps
Commander directs that all precautions are to
be taken which would be taken if its credibility
were established." Some of the clues offered as
proof of a possible attack included reports that
the Germans had brought up additional

reinforcements and artillery. The Corps' note
ended with a warning that "It is possible that
the attack may be postponed, if the wind is not
favourable, so as to blow the gases over our
trenches."29 Other warnings arrived at the British
and French headquarters. A German deserter
taken by the French on the thirteenth gave the
details ofthe proposed attack, although the story
of a second deserter captured by the French a
few days later offered contradictory information.
This, along with the Royal Flying Corps' (RFC)
failure to observe any inordinate German activity,
and the failure of the German assault to
materialise as expected during the night of 1516 April, caused the Allied high command to
relax its vigilance. The warning that the Germans
required a favourable wind- something that did
not occur on the original assault date - was
forgotten. By April twenty-second the British had
switched their attention to another portion of
the line. The Canadians, still being amateurs at
the time, took their cue from the British and
also stopped worrying about the possibility of a
poison gas attack. The result, as is well known,
was the near loss of the Ypres Sector and a sixtypercent casualty rate amongst the Canadians
caught in the German snare. 30
During the Canadians Corps' first trench
raid in November 1915, the lack of intelligence
helped prevent the 5th Battalion's raiding party
from entering the German trenches. Fortunately
for the Canadians a second raiding party,
comprised of men from the 7th Battalion, more
than made up for the fifth's short-coming.
Assaulting troops from the 5th Battalion
stumbled onto a previously undiscovered waterfilled ditch that blocked their path. Rendering
passage more hazardous was a wire
entanglement placed at its bottom. Crossing it
was impossible, so the raiders had to content
themselves with lobbing a few grenades into the
German trench and making a hasty retreat.:JJ At
the Somme, in October 1916, General Arthur
Currie, commander of the 1st Canadian
Division, pointed to poor intelligence work as a
contributing factor in his command's defeat at
Regina Trench. Patrol reports, he said, provided
a completely erroneous picture of the actual
conditions along the front by suggesting that the
artillery had effectively cut the German protective
wire. From these reports Currie "came to the
conclusion that while a certain amount of wire
was to be expected, it would offer no serious
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obstacle. The attacking troops were warned of
this and additional wire cutters served out as
an extra precaution." Events proved the
intelligence wrong. Currie wrote:
Reports on the condition of the wire were
unsatisfactory. Observation on the wire was poor
from the position occupied by our Infantry
Observers and the limited time at the disposal
of the Division did not permit of a protracted
search for suitable O.Ps. [observation posts].
Patrols were sent out, but owing to [the rapidity
of trench] reliefs these men never became
thoroughly acquainted with the ground and their
reports have since been proved to be very
inaccurate. Owing to weather conditions
Aeroplane reconnaissance photos were not
available.

In addition, Currie noted that patrolmen were
inexperienced due to the large influx of green
troops necessary after the heavy casualties
suffered in previous engagements. In the difficult
fighting that followed, attacking troops from
some units were caught on the wire and mowed
down by enemy machine guns. In other units
the wire drove the men into the trenches where
they tried to make their way to their objectives
by bombing their way forward from trench to
trench. They were unprepared for this type of
close fighting, however, and soon ran out of
grenades, leaving them nearly defenceless.
German counter attacks forced them back to
their start lines. 32

Despite these kinds of setbacks, most
operations saw officers and men praise the
intelligence organisation's efforts and
acknowledge its importance to winning trench
warfare. After its part in the fighting for Regina
and Desire Trenches during the later stages of
the Somme battle, the 87th Battalion declared:
In the attack of October 21st we had great
success ... partly due to the fact that everybody
was well acquainted with the landmarks. A week
before going up we made a model on a piece of
ground in our camp of the area which we should
have to go over. This showed all contours,
villages, trenches, C.T's [communication
trenches] and other landmarks and as every man
in the Battalion had been instructed in it and
studied it the consequence was that once in the
area they felt that they knew where they were.""

Of course, the model was based on the latest
intelligence. The 11th Brigade, too, was highly
laudatory of observation work during that same
assault.
An Observation Post was established in a
commanding position behind and connected to
the Brigade Commander by telephone. During
the first operation [October twenty-first against
Regina Trench] the Brigade Intelligence Officer
kept the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding]
informed minute by minute of the progress of
events and as a result, on several occasions
artillery action, promptly ordered, nipped off
budding counter attacks. "4

After their phenomenal success at Vimy Ridge
in April 191 7, the Canadians heaped further
A Canadian officer questions a captured German soldier, May 1917.
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praise on their intelligence service. The 3rd
Brigade reported:
The extraordinary success that the operation
met wilh, running as it did absolutely to timetable, emphasized the value of the training
received; the artillery preparation and cooperation, and the individual self confidence
of every man. Officers and Non-commissioned
Officers recognized the ground, and found that
what the Intelligence had told them that they
might expect to find in the way of dugouts,
trench mortar emplacements, machine gun
emplacements, etc., etc., they most certainly
did find.'l 5

General Currie, when summarising his division's
role in the battle, made this assessment of the
intelligence contribution:
The data had been very carefully arranged by
the Intelligence Branch of the Division and
proved very accurate and reliable. This fact
enabled targets of real value to be engaged by
the Heavy Artillery with the best results and the
minimum expenditure of ammunition
compatible with the task. The accurate location
of dugouts taken from a study of aeroplane
photographs was of great value in selecting
positions of Battalion Headquarters and
Advanced Report Centres as the advance
progressed.
The intelligence gained of the habits of the enemy
so as to enable us to harass him with the greatest
result, and lhe accurate information gained of
lhe area over which we had to attack was, I
consider, one of the main causes of our success. 36

Similar praise for intelligence work was
recounted in the other units and formations in
this and other actions throughout the warY
So far this article has explored the importance
of pre-battle intelligence. However, intelligence
gatherers continued to collect information during
operations. For the most part, it was used for
monitoring the progress of decisions already
made in the months, weeks and days leading up
to the advance, and not so much for making
important command decisions as the fighting
unfolded. There were, though, some occasions
where the information gathered was vital for
immediate decision-making, encouraging
commanders to push forward their reserves or
to continue pressing the enemy. During the 26
October 1917 assault at Passchendaele, for
example, troops from the 3rd Division were
ordered to capture a promontory called Bellevue
Spur. It was an important piece of high ground

needed as a base for future assaults against
Passchendaele Ridge. At one point, when it looked
as if the assault had failed, brigade observers
from the left attacking brigade "insisted that men
of the Right Brigade were still to be seen on the
Crest of BELLEVUE," even though "all other
reports indicated that the right Brigade troops
were back in theirJ.O.T. [jumpingofftrenches]."'38
"This information at that time was invaluable,"
for it meant the assault could still be salvaged.
Units from the supporting reserve battalion were
sent forward to help clear up the situation and
to join forces with the men holding out on the
ridge, with the result that "the Spur was
completely in our possession by the afternoon. "'19
Incidentally, this example also demonstrates the
importance of brigade observers as intelligence
gatherers during an action, and showed that the
effort involved in maintaining them was well
worth while.
By March 1918, when the Germans launched
their long-awaited offensive, tactics, unit-level
firepower, logistical support, communications,
and gunnery technique had all improved
dramatically since 1916. The result was a more
fluid battlefield, one that saw greater ebbs and
flows, deeper penetrations, and a more
sophisticated, all-arms approach to operations.
Moreover, the Germans launched their attacks
in rapid succession to take advantage of their
new stormtroop tactics and the disruption they
caused Allied command centres. During the 100
Days Campaign, between 8 August and 11
November 1918, the Allies reversed this trend,
and devastated the German Army in a
continuous series of blows that eventually forced
the German capitulation. The Canadians took
part in these counter offensives by spearheading
the British advance, and by launching no less
than seven major offensives. 40 The leisurely pace
at which intelligence had been collected prior to
such battles as Vimy Ridge ended as the need
for speed increased. Fortunately, by mid 1918
the intelligence system was so proficient that it
could and did collect a tremendous amount of
information within relatively short periods of
time. In the crossing of the Canal du Nord at the
end of September, the pre-battle counter battery
intelligence proved exceedingly complete and
accurate. In its after-action report the CBO wrote
that "In order to make certain that at least all
known and suspected hostile batteries were
neutralized it was found that 113 [enemy gun]
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positions had to be covered [by counter battery
fire)." Knowing that some of these 113 gun pits
would be vacant on Zero Day, the Counter
Battery Office relied on the services of the Royal
Air Force (RAFJ squadron attached to the corps
to inform it as to which pits were actually active
during the assault. The RAF was equal to the
task, and kept the batteries up to date on
German artillery movements. This let the heavy
batteries save ammunition, while concentrating
on targets where active enemy batteries really
were situated. After the battle the CBO
concluded, rather unassumingly, that
"Apparently the appreciation of the hostile
artillery situation had been substantially
correct for there were only six batteries active
in positions which had not been included in
the neutralization scheme" prepared before the
battle. In effect, nearly every German gun had
been located prior to Zero Hour and targeted
for destruction. 41 With such a wealth of
information success in the field came all the
easier.
Nevertheless, the rapidity with which
operations were now launched, and the
Germans' better use of camouflage, dummy
positions and tactical defensive layouts meant
that come Zero Day less was known with
certainty about the German lines than was the

case in previous years' battles. This meant that
there might be more undiscovered obstacles
facing assaulting troops or more undisclosed
German batteries able to pound the infantry
crossing no-man's-land. As a result of intensive
training programmes undertaken in the early
summer, though, the tactical acumen of the
average fighting man had greatly improved since
1916-1 7, while the firepower of his unit had
increased dramatically. 42 Unknown obstacles, be
they wire entanglements or German machine gun
posts, were overcome by men confident in their
abilities to carry on without their having to wait
for tank and artillery support. The Battle of
Amiens beginning on 8 August 1918, perhaps
more than any other Great War battle, shows
that well trained men could successfully confront
an entrenched enemy in largely unknown ground
and still out manoeuvre them.
The Canadians had moved to the Amiens
Sector in such secrecy, and in such haste, that
most commands only had time for a cursory
examination of the ground and their objectives
before going over the top. In some cases the
attacking troops, having travelled some 50 to
60 miles to get to the area, only arrived with a
few hours to spare. However, the decentralisation
of tactical decision-making practised in the
summer meant higher command could now rely

German prisoners and wounded Canadians coming through the
mud during the Battle of Passchendaele, November 1917.
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on the fighting prowess and tactical skill of their
men, rather than on top-down, minute-byminute plans of the Vimy Ridge variety.
Planning remained highly centralised, to be
sure, and orders were still packed with details
gathered by the intelligence organisation, but
their execution was left more and more to the
men doing the actual fighting. Reports on the
action make this plainly clear. A 7th Battalion
report noted that artillery preparation for
Amiens had been excellent. "As far as this
Battalion was concerned, isolated Machine
Guns and Rifle fire, were all that had to be
dealt with ... It was amply demonstrated that the
training in open warfare undergone whilst the
Corps was in rest was all to the good, by the
rapidity with which they were overcome with
very light casualties to ourselves." The 1Oth
Battalion echoed these sentiments when it
wrote that "the value of the recent training in
open warfare was very apparent, especially the
methods of overcoming machine gun
opposition, and the tactical exercises which
involved lengthy advances over more or less
unknown territory, were very useful."43 The 5th
Brigade described how on the second day of the
battle the German machine gun nests still
surviving:
were dealt with entirely by manoeuvre. Small
parties of scouts followed by Lewis Guns worked
up ditches, sunken roads and other dead ground
until the enemy's Machine Guns were put out of
action or forced to retire by enfilade fire from a
l1ank. When this had been accomplished a signal
was given to the Infantry. who meantime had
remained under cover, that they could advance.
Successive positions were dealt with in this
manner without incurring undue casualties. 44

Over in the 4th Canadian Division "The
enemy had a very strong Machine gun Defence
organized in the woods ... [This] opposition was
overcome by the successful employment of the
combined action of one Infantry Company of the
78th Battalion, an 18 pdr. Battery, 4 or 5 Tanks
and a 6 [inch] Trench Mortar, resulting in many
casualties to the enemy, the capture of 20
prisoners and 12 Machine guns." 45
Information, as well as tactical proficiency,
was crucial to men advancing across no-man'sland in the new combat environment. But the
need for information placed great stress on
available communications. Fittingly, by the
summer of 1918, communications had greatly

improved. 46 On those occasions where previously
undisclosed enemy artillery was pounding an
advance, or when machine gun nests and wire
entanglements were unyielding, the intelligence
organisation quickly transmitted the news and
nature of the hold-ups to those service arms that
could best provide assistance. An assortment of
ground observers (the artillery's Forward
Observation Officers, scouts, and infantry
observers), along with observers from the RAF,
the CCSS, and the Army organised sound
rangers, among a host of others monitoring the
advance, relayed an unending stream of news to
the Counter Battery Office, tank headquarters,
and other commands capable of affecting the
front line situation. Any hold-ups were quickly
dealt with, and usually by the crushing blow of
concentrated artillery fire.
By 1918, most of the intelligence effort that
occurred before and during battle concerned the
needs of the artillery. Andrew McNaughton, the
man who organised and ran the CBO until the
last weeks of the war, recalled later that "the
whole of our intelligence system was centred on
those who had the means at their disposal to
take immediate and effective action. "47 Those
with "the means at their disposal" were the
gunners who, for the most part, were under
corps and divisional control. 48 Since the artillery
could break up massing enemy troops preparing
for counter attacks, disrupt the arrival of enemy
reinforcements, ammunition, and food supplies,
silence and harass enemy guns, and eliminate
obstacles and pernicious pockets of enemy
troops and machine gun nests, it was the arm
that most readily influenced the course of battle,
and was most needful of up-to-date intelligence.
Reliable communications were obviously vital.
but so too were the men and special teams
gathering the information in the first place. Their
efforts bestowed enormous freedom of action on
corps, divisional and artillery officers who now
had sufficient information for taking advantage
of opportunities to inflict damage on enemy
troops and positions, and do so while battles
developed. The successful break-up of German
counter attacks, for example, was a direct result
of either careful study of pre-battle intelligence
regarding normal German routes of approach,
billeting areas and likely assembly areas, or of
word reaching the gunners during an attack that
German troops were seen massing at some
point. 49 During the fighting for Valenciennes in
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the closing days of the war, "Great importance
was attached to the harassing of all important
routes of approach, sunken roads and valleys;"
and in order "to give the infantry every possible
assistance at what was expected to be critical
parts of the battle, proposed assembly areas of
the enemy were subjected to timed
concentrations from the counter battery artillery."
A post battle review of the artillery's part at
Valenciennes "showed that very valuable results
had been obtained." Thanks in part to accurate
intelligence on such positions, "the enemy's
supplies of ammunition and reinforcements
[were] evidently greatly interfered with. The
casualties to the enemy's transport were
particularly high in the sunken roads .. .In some
cases the road was practically blocked by the
destroyed wagons and dead animals. "50
The RAF played an important intelligence role
throughout the 100 Days. Due to the speed with
which pilots could deliver news to the gunners,
the importance of the corps squadron as a source
of counter battery and other intelligence
continued to expand. Intelligence gathered by the
RAF usually arrived at the CBO within minutes
of its collection. This meant gunners could
continually harass German troops and batteries.
One Counter Battery Office memorandum
explained: "In the moving [battle] the aeroplane
forms the greatest source of intelligence. Its
advantage being that reliable information
regarding the disposition and movement of
enemy troops and the strength and grouping of
the Hostile Artillery can be quickly delivered to
the General Staff." 51 According to Lieutenant
Colonel H.D.G. Crerar, who replaced
McNaughton at the CBO during the last weeks
of the war, the Corps Squadron was "very often
the only reliable source of information" on the
location of hostile batteries, and that "the
effective neutralizing of hostile artillery fire at
critical moments may depend almost entirely
upon the work of the Corps Squadron." 52 At
Valenciennes "special importance" was attached
to the Corps Squadron's role in locating hostile
batteries on the day of battle. During that action
the Germans employed "roving batteries" that
moved across the front as needed. These were
difficult to locate by ground level means, so aerial
observers played a crucial role in finding them
through direct observation. Aerial photography
was useless for tracking such guns, as the
Germans did not dig pits for them, or keep them

long in one spot. During the battle, aerial
observers were therefore called upon to locate
all those guns that "had been impossible to
locate definitely prior to zero hour on account
of their having either remained silent or been
deployed in new positions." A CBO after-action
report declared that "On the whole the results
obtained [by the Corps Squadron] were most
gratifying ... Evidence from all sources
substantiates the fact that [German artillery]
shelling at zero and throughout the day was in
no way a menace to the advance of our
infantry ... A great deal of the [success of the]
neutralization programme for the day must be
attributed to the pilots and observers of No. 5
Squadron." Indeed, so effective were the pilots
at Valenciennes that "it was possible to follow
the enemy's artillery manoeuvres throughout
the day." 53
The First World War saw technological
advances that completely altered the face of
battle from what had been expected. Trenches,
barbed wire, machine guns and artillery
stopped armies in their tracks and forced men
to dig into the earth. The resulting deadlock
offered a unique opportunity for the
development of a tactical intelligence
organisation. The closeness of the opposing
lines, and the power of the defence, demanded
that they be constantly observed. With machine
guns and artillery capable of killing thousands
of men in a single day and checking attacks,
sometimes before they even started, with
relative ease, it was crucial that the enemy's
position and habits be studied in order for
thorough planning to take place. The shock of
modern warfare, combined with unreliable
communications and an ever-expanding
battlefield, also meant that commanders charged
with preparing and waging battle were bound to
lose control of the action once it began. The
development of the set-piece assault, however,
helped prevent this from happening on a regular
basis. As the name implies, set-piece attacks tried
to account for all contingencies and eliminate all
known obstacles in advance of the infantry going
over the top. Such intensive pre-planing
consumed a tremendous amount of information.
Early in the war the Canadians were unprepared
for the enormity of the task, and were without
intelligence units in their front-line commands
capable of collecting the required details. By
1916 this had begun to change, as battalions
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and brigades, for example, began employing
specialised scouting units. The year 1917 saw
further refinements and adaptations, as well
as the perfecting of the set-piece assault. That
year also witnessed the development of an
intelligence organisation that could quickly
retrieve, verify and manage the information
pouring into the various intelligence centres.
Fine-tuning continued into 1918, and during
the 100 Days Campaign General Currie, the
commander of the Canadian Corps since the
summer of 1917, believed that the intelligence
service possessed greater "elasticity than
hitherto" and was "adaptable to conditions as
they arose." With such flexibility, of course, the
Canadians could amass an incredible amount
of information on short notice and over great
distances. As a result, the Canadian Corps was
continuously supplied with vital information
for making plans and preparing movements
even though the tactical environment was far
more fluid than it had been only a year earlier.
Such versatility, in turn, helped make it
possible for the Canadians to launch a series
of attacks that, when combined with those
waged by its Allies, smashed the German Army.
Certainly, intelligence work was not the only
contributing factor to the Corps' ability to win
battles, but it was an indispensable ingredient.
The Canadians may have entered the First
World War without a well-developed or defined
intelligence service, but by November 1918, this
had been reversed. At the time of the Armistice,
wrote Currie, "the Canadian Corps Intelligence
Service," was "very complete;" its "system of
collecting
and
co-ordinating
information ... could almost be categorized as
perfect. "54
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